Wasting public money to buy turnout: quasi-experimental evidence from the Polish battle for fire trucks
Wasting public money to buy turnout: quasi-experimental evidence from the Polish battle for fire trucks
StatusPre-print
Alternative title
Authors
Gulczyński, Michał
Cześnik, Mikołaj
Monograph
Monograph (alternative title)
Date
2024-04-24
Publisher
Journal title
Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties
Issue
Volume
Pages
Pages
ISSN
1745-7289
ISSN of series
Access date
2024-10-18
Abstract PL
Abstract EN
It is well known that incumbents enjoy advantages in elections. Among others, they may use public resources to increase their electoral chances by mobilizing specific social groups to vote. In the 2020 presidential elections, the Polish government organised a competition: small municipalities with the highest turnout could win a fire truck. We exploit the threshold of 20,000 that arbitrarily divided municipalities into competing and non-competing for this public good and apply the quasi-experimental Regression Discontinuity Design. The competition aimed to increase the turnout in districts supporting the incumbent president. However, we find no evidence of any significant impact of the competition on the turnout or support for the incumbent around the threshold. We discuss why similar practices are common despite this result.
Abstract other
Keywords PL
Keywords EN
incumbency advantage
pork barrel
presidential elections
regression discontinuity
voting behaviour
pork barrel
presidential elections
regression discontinuity
voting behaviour
Keywords other
Exhibition title
Place of exhibition (institution)
Exhibition curator
Type
License type
Funder
Time range from
Time range to
Contact person name
Related publication
Related publication
Grant/project name
Collections
Views
20Acquisition Date31.08.2025
Downloads
36Acquisition Date31.08.2025
Altmetrics©
Dimensions
Google Scholar
