Purpose: The aim of this article is to analyze the statute (Act of Parliament) as the primary normative act within the system of universally binding sources of law in the Republic of Poland, with particular emphasis on its constitutional position, functions, and relationship to other sources of law. Methods: The study employs legal-dogmatic, historical, and descriptive methods. The analysis covers constitutional provisions, doctrinal views, the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Tribunal, and the evolution of delegated legislation within the Polish constitutional order. Results: The statute is a fundamental primary normative act of a general and abstract nature, enacted by Parliament in accordance with the procedure specified in the Constitution. Polish constitutional law does not provide for organic statutes; ordinary statutes therefore have equal legal force and are subordinate to the Constitution and, in the event of an irreconcilable conflict, to international agreements ratified with prior consent granted by statute. Discussion: The statute remains a foundation of the democratic state governed by the rule of law and performs a crucial guarantee function in the regulation of individual rights, freedoms, and duties. Its systemic position is reinforced by the absence of laws of intermediate legal force and by the marginal practical significance of delegated legislation.
The aim of this article is to analyse the constitutional aspects of the temporary impediment to the exercise of the office of President in context of the continuity of state authority. The author discusses the mechanism by which the Marshal of the Sejm or the Marshal of the Senate assumes the duties of President. Three procedures are analysed: independent notification by the President, proceedings before the Constitutional Tribunal at the request of the Speaker of the Sejm when the President is unable to deliver the notification himself, and suspension of office following the President’s impeachment before the State Tribunal. The article considers the form of the President’s declaration and considers the dispute surrounding the requirement for a countersignature by the Prime Minister. The author advocates for the absence of a countersignature requirement, considering the President’s notification of the temporary inability to hold office a power derived from resigning from office.
Multiperspective research (MPR) and qualitative longitudinal research (QLR) foreground relationality and temporality, respectively, in qualitative inquiry. Recent efforts to combine these methodologies as multiperspective qualitative longitudinal research (MPQLR) highlight its capacity to examine relational experiences of change over time, yet methodological guidance on how to practically plan and implement MPQLR remains limited. Drawing on our experience of conducting MPQLR studies, this article outlines the key stages of the MPQLR research process. After briefly reviewing existing literature, we present a step-by-step account of research design, data generation, and analysis, emphasizing the methodological challenges and analytic possibilities of integrating relational and temporal perspectives.
The article establishes who must disclose AI-generated content in a museum, when exceptions apply and whether labelling suffices for lawful use of a deceased person’s image and voice.
Methods: Interpretation of the AI Act and polish law, review of deployments.
Results: A museum using an avatar or an AI-generated description is a deployer of an AI system and from 2 August 2026 must label content under Article 50(4). for artistic content, only the form of disclosure changes. A description generated by a language model needs no label if a human genuinely reviewed it and editorial responsibility was assumed.
Discussion and conclusions: Other provisions govern the lawful use of the image and voice. As a rule, disseminating an image requires permission for 20 years after death. later, relatives’ consent is a precaution, not a statutory requirement, regarding the right to the memory of the deceased (kult pamięci).
The CJEU judgment in SCHUFA (C-634/21) redefines the ‘decision’ of Article 22 GDPR: if a score generated by one entity effectively determines another entity’s decision, the data subject is entitled to the protections of Article 22, regardless of whether a human formally signs off. This article asks what that reasoning means for medicine: when an algorithm’s output shapes a physician’s clinical judgment, does the patient have a right to know, and what must they be told? The discussion confronts the SCHUFA doctrine with informed consent requirements under Polish law and the new Article 12 of the Code of Medical Ethics, situates it against the international debate, distinguishes diagnostic from cognitive uses of AI through operational criteria, examines liability for algorithmic harm after Directive (EU) 2024/2853, and addresses the problem of large language models – tools physicians already use but which cannot be meaningfully certified.
