Emergency Price Regulation as a Constitutional Problem: From Diocletian to the Polish People's Republic

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dc.abstract.enAbstract. This article offers a constitutional and institutional analysis of emergency price regulation through a structural comparison of two historically distinct interventions: the Edict on Maximum Prices issued by Emperor Diocletian in 301 CE and the system of official price controls and rationing introduced during martial law in the Polish People’s Republic (1981-1983). Rather than treating these episodes as isolated historical curiosities, the study conceptualizes them as manifestations of a recurring pattern of crisis governance. The central thesis is that emergency price regulation represents a form of normative substitution in which political authority attempts to replace decentralized coordination mechanisms with administrative command. Drawing on institutional economics, constitutional theory of emergency powers, and legal theory of systemic complexity, the article introduces the concept of “Regulatory Utopia” as an analytical framework for understanding structural misalignment between legal normativity and economic coordination. The findings demonstrate that while emergency intervention may temporarily stabilise political order, suppression of the informational function of prices generates informal adaptation, institutional misalignment, and longterm erosion of legitimacy. The comparative perspective reveals structural recurrence across divergent constitutional orders and highlights the limits of normative power in governing complex economic systems during crisis.
dc.affiliationInstytut Prawa
dc.affiliationWydział Prawa w Warszawie
dc.contributor.authorSitek, Bronisław
dc.date.access2026-06-30
dc.date.accessioned2026-08-14T08:19:11Z
dc.date.available2026-08-14T08:19:11Z
dc.date.created2026-05-21
dc.date.issued2026-06-30
dc.description.abstract<jats:p>This article offers a constitutional and institutional analysis of emergency price regulation through a structural comparison of two historically distinct interventions: the Edict on Maximum Prices issued by Emperor Diocletian in 301 CE and the system of official price controls and rationing introduced during martial law in the Polish People’s Republic (1981-1983). Rather than treating these episodes as isolated historical curiosities, the study conceptualizes them as manifestations of a recurring pattern of crisis governance. The central thesis is that emergency price regulation represents a form of normative substitution in which political authority attempts to replace decentralized coordination mechanisms with administrative command. Drawing on institutional economics, constitutional theory of emergency powers, and legal theory of systemic complexity, the article introduces the concept of “Regulatory Utopia” as an analytical framework for understanding structural misalignment between legal normativity and economic coordination. The findings demonstrate that while emergency intervention may temporarily stabilise political order, suppression of the informational function of prices generates informal adaptation, institutional misalignment, and long-term erosion of legitimacy. The comparative perspective reveals structural recurrence across divergent constitutional orders and highlights the limits of normative power in governing complex economic systems during crisis.</jats:p>
dc.description.accesstimeat_publication
dc.description.issue1
dc.description.physical325-341
dc.description.sdgQualityEducation
dc.description.sdgPeaceJusticeAndStrongInstitutions
dc.description.versionfinal_published
dc.description.volume19
dc.identifier.doi10.32084/tkp.10663
dc.identifier.issn1899-7694
dc.identifier.urihttps://share.swps.edu.pl/handle/swps/2491
dc.identifier.weblinkhttps://ojs.academicon.pl/tkppan/article/view/10663
dc.languageen
dc.language.abstracten
dc.language.subjecten
dc.pbn.affiliationnauki prawne
dc.rightsCC-BY
dc.rights.questionYes_rights
dc.share.articleOPEN_JOURNAL
dc.subject.enregulatory utopia
dc.subject.enEdict of Diocletian
dc.subject.enmartial law in Poland
dc.subject.enprice ceilings
dc.subject.eninstitutional economics
dc.subject.encrisis governance.
dc.swps.sciencecloudsend
dc.titleEmergency Price Regulation as a Constitutional Problem: From Diocletian to the Polish People's Republic
dc.title.journalTeka Komisji Prawniczej PAN Oddział w Lublinie
dc.typeJournalArticle
dspace.entity.typeArticle